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DOING WELL BY DOING GOOD AND VICE
VERSA: SELF-SUSTAINING
NGO/NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
Barbara K. Bucholtz**
―We must cultivate our [own] garden.‖
Voltaire***
 TOM LEHRER, The Old Dope Peddler, on THE REMAINS OF TOM LEHRER
(RCA 2000) (original recording at Kresge Auditorium, MIT, Cambridge MA
11/23/59 and 11/24/59).
** Barbara K. Bucholtz, Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of
Law; Executive Director, Nonprofit Law Center, University of Tulsa.
Earlier, and somewhat different, versions of this paper were presented in
England at the ―Researching the Voluntary Sector‖ Conference, University of
Warwick, August 31, 2005; New York City at the ―Conference on
Entrepreneurship and Human Rights,‖ Fordham University Law School, August
1, 2005; Athens, Greece at the International Law Conference, University of
Athens, July 15, 2007; and in Canada at the ―Quo Vadis: The Boundaries of
Modern Law‖ Conference, at Osgood Hall Law School, York University, May
9, 2008. This final version benefits from the insights and comments of
conference colleagues and those of James Fishman and Russell Christopher.
*** The complete sentence, ―That is well said; but we must cultivate our
garden,‖ is the last sentence in Voltaire‘s Candide or Optimism, translated by
Peter Constantive, with an introduction by Diane Johnson (Modern Library,
2005). The sentence has traditionally been interpreted as a maxim, commanding
not only the protagonists in the book but also individuals in general. See P.N.
Furbank, Cultivating Voltaire’s Garden, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Dec. 15, 2005, at 68.
It is because Voltaire‘s sentence depends for its effect upon an ambiguity—not
so much in the word ―garden‖ as in the words ―our‖ and ―cultivate.‖ For ―our‖ is
to be understood in the plural—where it refers literally to Candide, Cunegorde,
Pangloss, etc., the owners of the garden—and in the singular, where it is
addressed metaphorically to any or every man or woman. As a maxim, it
instantly takes hold of the reader‘s imagination, and there are really no other
words in which it can be expressed.
Here, I intend that Voltaire‘s injunction apply to nonprofit organizations
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―I will do it myself: said the Little Red Hen, and she did!‖
The Little Red Hen

INTRODUCTION

The nonprofit sector is under siege. Recent articles pointing out
the astonishing rise of for-profit activity by associations in the
nonprofit sector advocate various forms of corrective regulation to
restrict or reform the sector.1 While acknowledging the
proliferation and the threat business activity may pose to the
integrity of the nonprofit sector, this Article argues that regulation,
alone, does not address the underlying problem: a significant
impetus for the increase in for-profit activity by nonprofits has
been the diminution in government services and resources to deal
with societal issues.2 Given the current bias against government, a
more complete description of the phenomenon must surely include
that feel compelled to raise money through various forms of entrepreneurial
activity, given the ideological context in which they operate. But, given the risks
commercial activity by nonprofits entails both to the sector itself, and to the
society in general, it is also addressed to the public and the sector through which
it acts: the government sector.
 THE LITTLE RED HEN (Penguin Group 2006). The reference here is to
the same effect. Nonprofits today often feel constrained to raise money by going
beyond traditional sources (donations; grants) for funding their respective
missions because the public, through its government sector, has withdrawn its
own support.
1
See John D. Colombo, Reforming Internal Revenue Code Provisions on
Commercial Activity by Charities, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 667 (2008) [hereinafter
Colombo, Reforming I.R.C. Provisions]; James J. Fishman, Wrongway Corrigan
and Recent Developments in the Nonprofit Landscape: A Need for New Legal
Approaches, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 567 (2007); see also John D. Colombo,
Commercial Activity and Charitable Tax Exemption, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV.
487 (2002); John D. Colombo, Regulating Commercial Activity by Exempt
Charities: Resurrecting the Commensurate-in-Scope Doctrine, 39 EXEMPT ORG.
TAX REV. 341 (2003).
2
See, e.g., Fishman, supra note 1, at 569 (―As government support declined
as a result of the Reagan revolution, there was a convergence of the for-profit
and nonprofit sectors. In the latter decades of the twentieth century, nonprofits
moved into activities, providing them with sources of revenue that were not
normally considered charitable[.]‖ (citations omitted)).
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a recognition of the role played by ideological policy choices in
contemporary American society, with its evident and generalized
preference for problem-solving through free market forces. This
Article explores some of the consequences of that policy
preference for the nonprofit sector, but it also insists that
recognition of the causal link between ideological policymaking
and the hazards unleashed by the expansion of commercial activity
by nonprofits must inform any reform of the law. The reduction in
services from the government has increased the pressure on
nonprofits to expand their own projects. New projects have
required new resources. The emergent entrepreneurial initiatives
can largely be explained by that phenomenon. A more pragmatic,
less ideological, approach to societal problem-solving will serve as
a significant corrective to commercial excesses in the nonprofit
sector and may point the way to a systemic overhaul rather than
merely restrictive reforms of the sector.
After an overview of the three associational sectors in
contemporary society (Part I) and the federal regulatory scheme
under which they operate (Part II), the Article describes various
forms of commercial activity by nonprofits and the dangers to the
sector that ineluctably attach to those activities (Part III). In Part
IV, I summarize the available evidence about the cause and effect
of nonprofit business ventures and argue that any reform of the
nonprofit sector must abandon ideological judgments of the public,
nonprofit and market sectors in favor of a pragmatic approach.
I. SOCIETY‘S THREE GOVERNANCE SECTORS
A. Attributes of Each Sector
In the United States, society is conceptualized as a tripartite of
sectoral divisions: the public (government) sector; the private
(business or market) sector and the not-for-profit (nonprofit or
NGO) sector.3 Each sector is presumed to have unique strengths
3

I use ―NGO‖ and ―nonprofit organizations‖ as interchangeable labels for
voluntary organizations in civil society which are neither governmental bodies
nor for-profit business associations, and exist to pursue a mission which is
important to their membership and which confer a recognized ―public benefit‖
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and singular weaknesses. 4 The public sector always has the powers
of purse and sword5 and, operating as a constitutional democracy,
is said to have the advantages of legitimacy, accountability and
transparency. However, the very democratic processes that
produce its legitimacy and require its accountability and
transparency simultaneously detract from its responsiveness, its
flexibility and its capacity to address unpopular but important
societal problems. Constitutional democracies are (undoubtedly)
ponderous, cumbersome and majoritarian as well as (presumably)
legitimate, accountable and transparent. Scholars call
government‘s weaknesses ―government failure.‖6 Conversely, both
upon society at large. See Margaret Gibelman & Sheldon R. Gelman, A Loss of
Credibility: Patterns of Wrongdoing Among Nongovernmental Organizations,
15 VOLUNTAS: INT‘L J. VOLUNTARY & NONPROFIT ORGS. 355, 357 (2004).
However, there is a vigorous debate over labels and definitions about and within
the sector because of the precision required for effective research about
nonprofits. Conceptual clarification and the necessity of defining categories
precisely affect the credibility of empirical findings. See Helmut K. Anheier,
Reflections on the Concept and Measurement of Global Civil Society, 18
VOLUNTAS: INT‘L J. VOLUNTARY & NONPROFIT ORGS. 1 (2007). Under the U.S.
Internal Revenue Code (―Code‖), the tax that describes and regulates various
kinds of nonprofit organizations—those which are deemed to confer a ―public
benefit‖—are designated as ―501(c)(3)‖ organizations (for the Code section
defining them), while other nonprofits (including various trade, political,
advocacy, social associations) are considered to be ―mutual benefit‖
organizations and are defined at sections 501(c)(4) through 501(c)(25) of the
Code. I.R.C. § 501(c) (2006). This paper‘s focus is 501(c)(3) or public benefit
organizations.
4
See generally LESTER M. SALAMON, AMERICA‘S NONPROFIT SECTOR: A
PRIMER 11–13 (2d ed., Foundation Center 1999). Salamon points out that the
inherent weaknesses of the business sector (―market failure‖) account for the
necessity of a nonprofit sector.
5
The power of the purse: to raise money through compulsory taxation. See,
e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (―Congress shall have [p]ower [t]o lay and
collect [t]axes . . . .‖). The power of the sword: to enforce its commands through
authorized force. Both are surely strengths. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3
(The President ―shall take [c]are that the [l]aws be faithfully executed . . . . ‖).
6
SALAMON, supra note 4. A related problem of government is that not only
are its actions directed by majority will, but they are constrained by rules of
equality. In contrast, nonprofit organizations in the private sector are free to
allocate resources without regard for majority will or equal treatment of
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the business sector and the nonprofit sector lack the powers of
purse and sword but have the advantages of expeditious action,
flexibility and the authority to operate without majority support
from the public-at-large. Nonetheless, they can never claim the
legitimacy of a democratic government. Nor, as private
organizations, are they required to be transparent and accountable
to the larger society. Moreover, the business sector can be
distinguished from the nonprofit sector on the crucible of
profitability. Businesses famously avoid unprofitable projects that
are otherwise important—scholars call this trait ―market failure.‖ 7
Therefore, nonprofits can be considered the sector of last resort or
the safety net for worthy projects rejected by the government (as
unpopular) and by the market (as unprofitable).8
Understanding these characteristics helps develop an analytical
baseline from which to assess each sector‘s aptitude for addressing
specific societal projects and to predict the degree of success a
particular sector is likely to attain by engaging a particular societal
task.9 In the larger sense, however, the suitability of a sector for a
particular task is dependent upon more than its inherent strengths
and weaknesses. The political, economic and social milieu in
which the societal project is situated must be considered. Different
societies may assign various projects to different sectors.
Furthermore, within a given society, project assignments may shift
over time. 10 Soldiers might be government employees in one war
recipients. Discussing this aspect of private foundation work, Steven
Heydemann calls this ―positive discrimination.‖ See generally Steven
Heydemann, Doing Democracy’s Work? Studying The Transformation of
Global Philanthropy in the Twentieth Century, 2 DEMOCRACY & SOCIETY 5
(Spring 2005).
7
SALAMON, supra note 4, at 7.
8
See generally Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit
Organizations from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54 (1981).
9
A suggestive example might be the problems associated with the use of
mercenary forces under the direction of private corporations. See, e.g., JEREMY
SCAHILL, BLACKWATER: THE RISE OF THE WORLD‘S MOST POWERFUL
MERCENARY ARMY (Nation Books 2008). Do the profit motive and the lack of
accountability, transparency and legitimacy lend themselves to a satisfactory
result in this context?
10
See generally Peter Dobkin Hall, Historical Overview of the Private
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and mercenaries in the next. Jails might be government-owned in
one era and privately-owned in the next, and so forth. 11 In any
event, while the inherent attributes of each sector do not preordain
its assignment to a particular societal problem, policy choices that
lack a pragmatic appreciation for the importance of these
characteristics seem questionable. 12 On that basis alone, one may
reasonably challenge the efficacy of policy choices driven by a
dominant political philosophy that disparages the government
sector and reifies the business sector.13
Nonprofit Sector, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK (Walter
W. Powell ed., 1987); see also Gibelman & Gelman, supra note 3, at 357. A
recent example has emerged in California where private firefighting companies
have become big business. Other states evince a rise in private companies‘
presence in the industry as well, but California‘s situation—owing to its recent
problems with wildfires—is the most publicized example. Interestingly, this
trend toward private contracting in the firefighting industry recalls colonial
times when firefighting was exclusively the purview of the private sector.
Experts are concerned about the trend for the very reasons that firefighting
became a public sector obligation and private firefighting was abandoned: lack
of transparency and accountability in training and performance standards in
private sector firefighting and a concern about the public interest and common
good. ―‗[F]ire protection should be available to all citizens regardless of how
much money they have.‘‖ Malia Wollan, For Hire: Private Firefighters, TULSA
WORLD, July 16, 2008, at A5 (quoting Lori Moore-Merrell, a researcher for the
International Association of Firefighters).
11
An interesting instance was New York University‘s dominance in the
pasta manufacturing business during the 1940s and 1950s. See, e.g., C.F.
Mueller Co. v. Comm‘r, 190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951). There, the court held that
C.F. Mueller, a manufacturer and seller of macaroni and related products,
qualified for exemption under § 501(c)(3) because its profits were distributed to
its sole shareholder, New York University, for the exclusive benefit of its School
of Law. Id. at 123.
12
Imagine a statute mandating that prisons maintain high standards
protecting inmate rights and that they institute practices designed to diminish
recidivism. Imagine further that traditional prisons with practices designed
simply to warehouse prisoners in order to protect the public from them are
highly profitable. Finally, imagine that on economies of scale, the larger the
prison population, the more profitable the prison. Pragmatically speaking, would
the government sector or private businesses be more likely to implement the
statute effectively?
13
In an earlier article, I argued that U.S. efforts to privatize human rights
initiatives are fundamentally flawed. The attempt to develop quasi-constitutional
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B. The Ideological Turn in Public Policy
As a consequence of America‘s current suspicions of the public
sector, the United States has undergone a massive ―downsizing‖ of
government services either by way of ―out-sourcing‖ its traditional
functions to business and nonprofit organizations, or by
―privatizing‖ services simply by failing to provide them.
Government downsizing has placed a significant burden on the
nonprofit sector: NGOs are now asked to provide many outsourced
services under government contract and to fill the societal void left
by unprofitable services the government has abandoned. 14 In
tandem, these two dimensions of government downsizing have
stretched the financial resources of nonprofits—flowing from their
traditional sources of donations and grants—to the limit.
In response, nonprofit organizations have increasingly turned
to for-profit business activity as a venue for supporting their
respective missions. And while nonprofits have historically
engaged in for-profit activities to raise money, these new
commercial initiatives in this new era of government downsizing
are often different in degree and kind. This new path from
traditional sources of financial support to some measure of
commercially generated financial independence is as fraught with
human rights norms through voluntary codes of conduct which have been
developed exclusively by multi-national corporations and their trade groups
appears to be an ineffective substitute for government-generated rules. As a
practical matter, voluntary codes suffer from two major shortcomings:
disclosure (or transparency) and compliance (or enforcement). Quite obviously,
no one expects rigorous adherence to rules when disclosure and compliance are
merely voluntary. Moreover, and putting the problem of their enforceability to
one side, it is questionable whether codes drafted by various business entities
can ever lay claim to the gravitas of constitutional legitimacy. Barbara K.
Bucholtz, Privatizing Human Rights Initiatives: How Asian Countries Can
Avoid the Flaws in the U.S. Model, 17 J. ASIAN ECON. 41 (2006). See also
SALAMON, supra note 4, at 7–10.
14
Gibelman & Gelman, supra note 3, at 357. The authors point out that the
downsizing phenomenon has affected NGOs worldwide: ―The growth and
development of NGOs in the last quarter of the 20th century related, in part, to
the worldwide quest to find alternatives to government service provision, a quest
largely borne out of disillusionment with government‘s handling of the welfare
state.‖ Id. (internal citations and references omitted).
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peril as it is with promise. Teasing out both aspects of the
phenomenon adds to our understanding as to whether, or to what
extent, this commercial turn in nonprofit activity is beneficial.
However, both the pragmatic dimensions of commercialization and
the effects of statutory constraints should be considered.
II. STATUTORY CONSTRAINTS ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR
A. Overview of Exempt Organization Regulation under the
Internal Revenue Code
As described by the Internal Revenue Code, the nonprofit
universe is large and diverse, encompassing some twenty-eight
categories of not-for-profit associations. 15 That universe is divided
into two fundamentally different kinds of association: those that
are organized for some ―public benefit‖ and those that are
organized for some ―mutual benefit‖ 16 or shared interest of their
members. 17 The public benefit associations are also divided by the
Code into two categories: (1) private grant making and operating
foundations18 and (2) public operating charities. While all 501(c)
organizations enjoy income tax exemption, § 501(c)(3) operating
charities and most § 509 private foundations also benefit from a
tax deduction for their donors.19
This Article is concerned exclusively with § 501(c)(3)
operating charities. It is within this category that commercial
activity is burgeoning and it is this activity which most concerns
recent scholarship calling for reform. 20 One place to begin a
15

See generally I.R.C. § 501(c) (2006).
―Mutual benefit‖ organizations include shared trade, political and social
interests. See id. § 501(c)(4)–(28); see also id. §§ 501(d), 501(e), 501(f), 501(k)
& 521.
17
See I.R.C. § 509 (2006).
18
See id. §§ 170(c)(2), 2055(a)(2) & 2522(a)(2).
19
Fishman, supra note 1, at 569–71.
20
See, e.g., Trinidad v. Sagrada Order de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578, 582
(1924). Tax breaks for charities are, thus, often rationalized as a ―quid pro quo.‖
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 328 (James J. Fishman & Stephen Schwarz eds.,
Foundation Press, 3d ed. 2006).
16
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discussion of the statutory constraints on these charitable
organizations is with the legislative purpose or policy behind the
statutory sections that confer the tax benefits they enjoy under the
Internal Revenue Code. Not always an exemplar of legislative
clarity, the tax code itself gives no indication of the legislators‘
intent, nor does the congressional bill from which the Code
sections derive. 21 Undoubtedly, the tax breaks enjoyed by charities
are part of a philanthropical tradition with its roots in Western
history and, surely, they are derived from the Elizabethan era‘s
Statute of Charitable Uses in England. 22 But the tax exempt status
of nonprofits has, perhaps, been rationalized best by Supreme
Court case law which has explained that exempt charities provide a
―public benefit‖ by conferring resources and services which the
government (and, therefore, taxpayers) would otherwise have to
finance. 23 In that sense, it can be said that a charity‘s activities
contribute to the tax base by providing goods and services that
taxes would be obliged to finance. As a preliminary legal matter,
then, any charitable entity claiming § 501(c)(3) status but engaging
in commercial activity must demonstrate that it is providing a
public benefit. 24
The concept of ―public benefit,‖ in turn, can best be described
by the categories of ―charitable purposes‖ codified in the Statute of
Charitable Uses, and listed in the Restatements (Second) and
(Third) of Trusts;25 under the 2006 draft of the American Law
Institute (ALI) Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Organizations; 26
and in the Treasury Regulations promulgated under § 501(c)(3) of
21

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 368 cmt. a (1959); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. a (2003).
22
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 370 (Discussion Draft
2006).
23
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (2006); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,
461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983) (stating that ―charitable exemptions are justified on
the basis that the exempt entity confers a public benefit . . . which the society or
the community may not itself choose or be able to provide‖).
24
See, e.g., Treas. Reg § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (2006).
25
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 368 cmt. a (1959); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. a (2003).
26
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 370 (Discussion Draft
2006).
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the tax code.27 As Marion R. Fremont-Smith has explained, all of
these authorities identify similar categories of charitable purposes
and share the same broad view of their interpretation. 28 These
categories are: ―relief of poverty, advancement of knowledge or
education, advancement of religion, promotion of health and
governmental or municipal purposes and ‗[o]ther purposes . . .
which are beneficial to the community.‘‖29
In addition to the overarching requirement of a public benefit
mission and the necessity of fitting within a recognized charitable
category, a § 501(c)(3) charity must observe the following
requirements:
1. The Exclusivity Test: it must be operated ―exclusively‖
for its charitable purpose mission.30
2. The Nondistribution Constraint or the No Private
Inurement Rule: its net income may not ―inure to the
benefit‖ of an insider (member; employee) within the
organization.31
27

Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (2006).
Marion R. Fremont-Smith, The Search for Greater Accountability of
Nonprofit Organizations: Recent Legal Developments and Proposals for
Changes, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 609, 616–17 (2008).
29
Id. at 617. Section 501(c)(3) provides that organizations receive the tax
exemption for public charities if they are:
Operated exclusively for religious, charitable scientific, testing for
public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or
international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its
activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or
for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net
earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or
individual, no substantial part of the activities is carrying on
propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation (except as
otherwise provided in subsection (h) and which does not participate in
or intervene in . . . the political campaign of any candidate for public
office.
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
30
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). The term ―exclusively,‖ however, is a term of art that
is not applied literally or narrowly. See Treas. Regs. §§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1), (2)
(as amended in 2008).
31
Treas. Regs. §§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1), (2) (as amended in 2008). Unlike
28
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3. Lobbying and Campaigning Prohibitions: while a charity
is absolutely precluded from campaigning for a political
candidate, it is permitted to engage in limited lobbying
efforts as long as ―no substantial part‖ of its operations is
engaged in attempting to influence legislation. 32
Business activity can threaten the exempt status of a charity
under the legislative constraints of the exclusivity test and the nondistribution rule as well as other statutory rules governing
nonprofit associations.
B. Federal Tax Code Restraints That Affect Commercial
Activity by Nonprofits
1.

The Exclusivity Test

For purposes of constraining commercial activity, the
exclusivity test is obviously most relevant.33 To what extent or at
what point might a nonprofit‘s business cause it to fail the
exclusivity requirement? Case law and agency regulation have not
imposed a strict standard of exclusivity on nonprofit operations. 34
Some deviation from activities that are ―exclusively‖ missionrelated has been consistently permitted. Furthermore, early case
law interpreting § 501(c)(3) established a longstanding precedent
for-profit corporations, insiders in nonprofit organizations cannot ―profit‖ from
income generated by charities. Although charities may very well be profitable,
that profit, after expenses of running the charity have been paid, must inure to
the benefit of the charitable mission, not the charity‘s members or employees. In
order to save the exempt status of otherwise qualified charities who may run
afoul of this private benefit rule by providing excess benefits to insiders,
Congress has provided intermediate sanctions or penalties in lieu of revocation
of the organization‘s nonprofit status, which remains the ultimate sanction for
violation of the no private inurement rule. See I.R.C. § 4958 (2006); I.R.C.
§ 6033(b)(12) (2006).
32
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3) (as amended in 2008). Charities can
protect themselves from the vagaries of the ―no substantial part‖ language by
electing 501(h) formulas for determining permissible levels of lobbying activity
or by channeling lobbying efforts through a 501(c)(4) affiliate. Id.
33
See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
34
See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3) (as amended in 2008).
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that some commercial activity, extraneous to the charitable
mission, was permitted without violating the exclusivity test.35
Indeed, for decades following the Trinidad decision, any amount
of commercial activity was permitted under the exclusivity test as
long as the net proceeds of the business were dedicated to the
charitable mission.36 This was called the ―destination of income‖
test; its zenith, now celebrated in law school lore, is the C.F.
Mueller case,37 which exonerated a successful pasta business
operated exclusively for profit because its net profits supported the
New York University law school.38 Whether the safe harbor for
commercial activity provided by the ―destination of income‖ rule
has been completely eliminated by subsequent legislation and
regulation is still somewhat unclear.
2.

The Unrelated Business Income Tax

The Unrelated Business Income Tax (―UBIT‖), as well as the
Treasury regulation promulgated under it, is the second major
legislative constraint upon business activity by nonprofit
associations.39 Facially, UBIT appears not to foreclose nonprofit
status for charities that engage in commercial projects. Rather, it
imposes a tax on a nonprofit‘s business income generated through
activities not related to its charitable mission. Congress did,
however, expressly foreclose nonprofit status for organizations that
are exclusively for-profit but dedicate net proceeds to affiliated
charities (―feeder organizations‖). 40 Thus, with the exception of
35

See Trinidad v. Sagrada Order de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578, 582 (1924)
(holding that sales of specialty foodstuffs by a religious organization, even
though commercial and not the organization‘s charitable mission, did not cause
it to fail the exclusivity test).
36
Colombo, Commercial Activity and Charitable Tax Exemption, supra
note 1, at 497–98.
37
C.F. Mueller Co. v. Comm‘r, 190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951).
38
Id.
39
I.R.C. §§ 511514 (2006). Section 513 provides that any ―trade or
business‖ which is regularly carried on by a nonprofit and ―not substantially
related‖ to its charitable mission will be taxed as ordinary business income. Id.
§ 513.
40
Id. § 502.
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feeder organizations, one could argue that UBIT only taxes
charities for business activity unrelated to their mission. It does not
appear to jeopardize their exempt status under § 501(c)(3). But a
closer look at the Treasury regulations and Revenue Rulings of the
Internal Revenue Service (―Service‖) call that conclusion into
question. Specifically, it is possible to detect an ambiguity, if not a
contradiction, between the language of different regulations.
Treasury Regulation § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(i), dealing with tax
exempt status, says that to attain or maintain its exempt status, a
nonprofit‘s charter may permit only an insubstantial part of its
operations to consist of ―activities which in themselves are not in
furtherance of one or more exempt purposes.‖41
Is business activity to support its exempt purpose considered an
―in furtherance of‖ activity? Experts have concluded that only
substantial unrelated business activity not ―in furtherance of‖ an
exempt purpose would disqualify a nonprofit from exempt status.42
Thus, business activity that supports the charity but is not
substantial will not threaten the charity‘s mission. Is this
interpretation of the exemption rules consistent with UBIT
regulations? Are the terms ―in furtherance of‖ under § 501(c)(3)
regulations and ―unrelated activity‖ under UBIT consonant?
Ambiguity lurks in key terms: is any ―unrelated activity‖ under
UBIT ―in furtherance of‖ a charitable mission or not?43 The final
41

Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(i)(b) (2006).
A nonprofit engaged in business activity may be exempt in spite of the
fact that
it operates a trade or business as a substantial part of its activities, if the
operation of such trade or business is in furtherance of the
organization‘s exempt purpose or purposes and if the organization is
not organized or operated for the primary purpose of carrying on an
unrelated trade or business, as defined in section 513.
Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e)(1). Professor Colombo concludes the pivotal provision is
―in furtherance of‖ and seems to give that kind of commerce an imprimatur. But
as he incisively points out, it is not clear whether UBIT activity is ―in
furtherance of.‖ Colombo, Reforming I.R.C. Provisions, supra note 1, at 671
(citing Jessica Pena & Alexander L.T. Reid, A Call for Reform of the
Operational Test for Unrelated Commercial Activity in Charities, 76 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1855, 1863–64 (2001)).
43
Colombo, Reforming I.R.C. Provisions, supra note 1, at 671.
42
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regulations issued under UBIT suggest that they are not: to avoid
the UBIT tax, an activity like a commercial venture must be
―substantially related‖ to the exempt purpose, requiring that the
venture intend ―to further (other than through the production of
income)‖ the exempt purpose.44 The ―other than through the
production of income‖ language of UBIT is in conflict with the ―in
furtherance of‖ language of the regulation on exemption at
Treasury Regulation § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e).45
One way to synthesize the language is to read the two
provisions as serving two different legislative purposes. Then
―substantially related‖ and ―to further‖ (or ―in furtherance of‖) can
mean something quite different when you are speaking about the
§ 501(c)(3) exemption or about UBIT taxation. In citing a 1964
revenue ruling, Professor John Colombo argues that the regulations
should be, and have been, harmonized by interpreting UBIT
regulations to preclude income generation as passing an ―in
furtherance of‖ test while income generation in furtherance of
§ 501(c)(3) exemption is permissible.46 Some commentators have
argued that this same 1964 revenue ruling gives guidance to
nonprofits that seek to ensure their for-profit activity passes
regulatory muster by creating a ―commensurate in scope test.‖47
That test, upon which the ruling was based, simply says that even
where a nonprofit relies solely on business-generated income, it
will not lose its exempt status as long as its charitable operations
are ―commensurate in scope‖ with the amount of financial
resources dedicated to its charitable mission. 48 Further assurance
may be found in a memorandum from IRS General Counsel upon
which the 1964 revenue ruling itself relied. It stated that the
44

Treas. Reg. § 1.513-2(a)(4) (2006).
See Colombo, Reforming I.R.C. Provisions, supra note 1, at 671–72.
46
Id. at 672–73 (citing Rev. Rul. 64-182, 1964-1 C.B. 186, for the
proposition that rental income as a principal source of revenue for a nonprofit
would not cause it to lose its exempt status but would be taxable as unrelated to
its charitable mission).
47
See Thomas Kelley, Rediscovering Vulgar Charity: A Historical
Analysis of America’s Tangled Nonprofit Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2486
(2005).
48
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 20, at 598.
45
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―primary purpose‖ test, which elaborates and liberalizes the
―exclusivity‖ requirement of § 501(c)(3), looks to ―the dedication
of net revenues from an unrelated business to charitable
purposes . . . .‖49 By logical contrast, only where business income
is not significantly dedicated to the charity‘s mission will the
charity fail the exclusivity test and lose (or never receive) its
exempt status.50
Despite
these
reassuring
interpretations,
however,
indeterminacies and ambiguities in pivotal statutory language
construed under an ―all the facts and circumstances‖ test 51 counsel
caution for charities engaged in commercial activity. Business
activity by a charity may not only be taxed under UBIT, it may
threaten a charity‘s exempt status. Given those risks, a charity may
(as many have done) separate itself from its business activity by
creating a for-profit subsidiary to house its business operations.52
But that strategy may prove an illusory safe harbor.
3.

Section 509 Foundations

Other Code sections reveal different hazards for this kind of
entrepreneurial activity by a wholly owned subsidiary of a charity.
It is possible that a nonprofit that sustains itself with an unrelated
business may find itself recategorized as a more heavily regulated
private foundation rather than as a public charity.53 The problem
might arise whenever a charity is primarily supported by a

49

Colombo, Reforming I.R.C. Provisions, supra note 1, at 673.
Professor Colombo quotes a more recent General Counsel Memorandum
to that effect. Id. at 674 n.30.
51
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 20, at 59798 (―[T]he primary
purpose test looks to ‗all the facts and circumstances . . . including the size and
extent of the trade or business and the size or extent of the activities, which are
in furtherance of one or more exempt purposes.‘‖(quoting Treas. Reg.
§ 1.50(c)(3)-1(e) (2006)).
52
See infra Part III.D.
53
Private foundations are § 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations but they are
not public charities. See I.R.C. § 509(a) (defining a private foundation in
contrast to public charities). Operating charities are § 501(c)(3) public charities.
Id. § 501(c)(3).
50
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financially successful business subsidiary owned by the charity.54
As the parent corporation, 55 the charity could receive enough
financial support through subsidiary dividends so that it does not
have to rely on any support from outside sources, in the form of
donations and government or private grants. Members of the parent
organization govern the organization without including outside
directors56 on the subsidiary‘s or its own governing board of
directors. In that situation, the organization would strongly
resemble a private foundation with respect to the attributes for
which Congress determined that foundations required special
regulation.57 From the legislative perspective, private foundations
may be distinguished from operating (public) charities by their
funding source (a family or an individual, as opposed to a disparate
group of donors from the public-at-large) and by their governing
body (a policy-making board that directs the activities of the
organization whose directors are drawn from the family or a small
insular group, as opposed to a governance board drawn from
diverse members of the community).
Another distinguishing feature of foundations is that they are
usually grant-making institutions that give financial support to
operating charities rather than perform charitable services
themselves. 58 For decades, private foundations were treated like
operating charities under the federal tax code. But during the 1950s
54

For a discussion of this kind of self-sustaining nonprofit, see infra Part

III.D.
55

―Parent corporation‖ is a term of art in corporate governance law that
usually indicates that one corporation (the ―parent‖) owns another corporation
(the ―subsidiary‖) because it owns all the shares of stock of the subsidiary (―sole
shareholder‖). See generally WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER H. KRAAKMAN &
GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS 30611 (2d ed. 2007).
56
―Outside directors‖ in corporate governance law parlance means
directors who are not members or employees—that is, ―insiders‖—in the
organization. Id. at 32223.
57
See generally the Tax Reform Act of 1969, infra note 60 and
accompanying text.
58
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 20, at 75354 (quoting F.
EMERSON ANDREWS, PHILANTHROPY IN THE UNITED STATES 43 (Philanthropic
Foundations 1974).

BUCHOLTZ_6-5-09

6/6/2009 12:35 PM

DOING WELL BY DOING GOOD AND VICE VERSA

419

and 1960s, Congress began to take legislative steps to distinguish
these two kinds of § 501(c)(3) organizations by ratcheting up the
regulatory structures applied to private foundations. 59 That
movement culminated in the Tax Reform Act of 1969. 60 Public
outcry that led to this new regulatory regime for private
foundations included concerns about financial corruption (using
tax breaks to benefit insiders rather than exempt purposes) and
political influences (using foundation money to support leftist
causes). 61 But the overarching concern seems to have been the
insularity of the private foundation: its privileged ability to sustain
itself and its selected causes coupled with its undiluted authority to
champion its own notions of what causes were in the public
interest.62
Succinctly, one might ask: If charities must perform a public
benefit, who gets to say which causes within a charitable category
most benefit the public and should be supported by a foundation?
Public charities that rely on financial support from the public must,
to a great extent, rely on a consensus notion of public benefit to
maintain the public‘s financial support. Foundations, however, are
self-sustaining and thus do not solicit public monies. As a
consequence, they are not dependent upon public support to
advance the causes they select. The same can be said for selfsustaining operating charities financed by sufficiently profitable
business subsidiaries. Both avoid public accountability. By
analogy, self-sustaining charities might be considered ―operating
foundations‖ if not ―grantmaking foundations.‖ 63 Both are more
heavily regulated than operating public charities. 64 Thus, a charity
59

Id. at 592–99 (quoting WALDEMAR A. NIELSON, The BIG FOUNDATIONS:
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND STUDY 7–17 (Columbia University Press
1972)).
60
Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 1(a), 83 Stat. 487 (1969)
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 1).
61
See NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 20, at 82729.
62
Id. at 761.
63
Tanya D. Marsh, A Dubious Distinction: Rethinking Tax Treatment of
Private Foundations and Public Charities, 22 VA. TAX REV. 137, 141 (2002)
64
The distinction between ―operating foundations‖ and private foundations
is that operating foundations operate organizations that perform charitable or
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supported by its for-profit subsidiary is open to a judicial challenge
as to whether the corporate veil, which sets up a protective wall of
separation between it and its subsidiary, should be pierced.
Under most state corporate governance statutes, the owner
(individual shareholder or corporate parent) of a for-profit
subsidiary will be protected by a shield of limited liability for the
debts of the corporation she/it owns. 65 Delaware, for example,
provides that owners/shareholders ―shall not be personally liable
for the payment of the corporation‘s debts except as they may be
liable by reason of their own conduct or acts . . . . ‖66 But the shield
itself has been limited by an equitable doctrine of the common law
known as ―piercing the corporate veil.‖ 67 The doctrine permits
courts to disregard the separate corporate existence that shields the
owners from the debts of their corporation under a two-pronged
test.68
The first prong asks whether the formalities required by
corporate governance statutes have been observed so that the
business appears to be operating as a legal entity separate from its
owners, or whether it appears to be a ―mere instrumentality‖ of its
owners because there is ―such unity of interest and ownership that
the separate personalities of the corporation and its
shareholders . . . are indistinct . . . .‖69 The second prong asks
whether the corporate form is being used to evade other ―legal
obligations.‖70 To be sure, the ―piercing‖ doctrine has been applied
public benefit services. Museums are an example; their mission is to advance
public understanding and appreciation of art by exhibiting art collections. But,
because they are typically supported and dominated by a small and insular
group, they retain the status of foundations, not charities. See NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 20, at 82729.
65
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 176002 (2006); OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1006 (2006).
66
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(6) (2006); accord MODEL BUS. CORP.
ACT § 6.22(b) (2004).
67
See, e.g., NLRB v. Greater Kansas Roofing, 2 F.3d 1047, 1051–55 (10th
Cir. 1993) (providing discussion on the doctrine); Mobridge Cmty. Ind. v.
Toure, 273 N.W.2d 128, 132 (S.D. 1978) (same).
68
Greater Kansas Roofing, 2 F.3d at 1052.
69
Id.; see also Mobridge, 273 N.W.2d at 132.
70
Greater Kansas Roofing, 2 F.3d at 1052 (―[W]ould adherence to [the
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sparingly as an instrument to protect creditors.71 Furthermore, there
are strong public policy reasons for maintaining the legal fiction of
a shield. 72 Nonetheless, there is nothing to preclude application of
this intractably vague doctrine 73 where, as here, the separate
corporate entities are, arguably, being used to evade either income
taxation under UBIT, termination of exempt status under
§ 501(c)(3) regulations, or the stringent regulations applicable to
legal] corporate fiction sanction fraud, promote injustice or inequitable
consequences or lead to an evasion of legal obligations.‖).
71
See Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 475 (2003) (―The
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, however, is the rare exception, applied in
the case of fraud or certain other exceptional circumstances . . . and usually
determined on a case-by-case basis.‖).
72
―Piercing the corporate veil‖ to hold shareholders liable for the liabilities
of a corporation is indeed a rare judicial act. See generally ALLEN, KRAAKMAN
& SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 55, at 151.
The most frequently invoked—and radical—form of shareholder
liability in the cause of creditor protection is the equitable power of the
court to set aside the entity status of the corporation and hold its
shareholders liable directly . . . . One common formulation [of the
doctrine] requires that plaintiff shows the existence of a shareholder
who completely dominates corporate policy and uses her control to
commit . . . a ―wrong‖ . . . Another formulation . . . calls on courts to
disregard the corporate form whenever recognition of it would extend
the principle of incorporation ―beyond its legitimate purposes and
[would] produce injustices or inequitable consequences.‖ [citation
omitted]. All courts agree that veil piercing should be done
sparingly . . . .
Id. See also Colombo, Reforming I.R.C. Provisions, supra note 1, at 674 n.57
and accompanying text.
73
In his case book, Chiappinelli calls the doctrine ―a mystery.‖ ERIC A.
CHIAPPINELLI, CASES AND MATERIALS ON BUSINESS ENTITIES 276 (Aspen
2006). He comments,
[i]t is one of the most frequently litigated issues in corporate law but,
although the doctrine is quite old, courts are vague and inconsistent in
their statement of the legal principles involved. When courts apply the
doctrine, their opinions are nearly always simply gestalt results rather
than genuinely articulated decisions . . . . [In Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry.
Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926),] Judge Cardozo called piercing the
corporate veil a doctrine ―enveloped in the mists of metaphor.‖
Id.
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foundations. Charities that sustain their operations financially
through the business ventures of for-profit subsidiaries are
vulnerable to the charge that they are, in tandem with their forprofit subsidiaries, operating as private foundations.
A court might reason that the purposes for which shareholders
are granted limited liability under corporate governance laws—to
protect a parent shareholder from liability for the debts of its
subsidiary—should not be used to evade laws designed to act as
surrogates for public participation in the decision-making of
foundations, to force public accountability or to ensure public
benefits. 74 On those grounds, a court might pierce the corporate
veil between the charitable parent and the commercial subsidiary
that finances its operations under a theory of ―enterprise entity.‖75
The analogy seems to work; enterprise entity theory allows parentsubsidiary or brother-sister corporations to be treated as single
entities whenever the operations of each form a single business
enterprise. A charity and its own business subsidiary that sustains
it might also be considered a single enterprise.76 As a single
enterprise, a public charity of this sort could be deemed either a
private foundation or an operating foundation, depending on
whether its charitable operations are grant-making (like a private
foundation) or charitable activities (like a public operating charity).
Like the charity that engages in commerce itself, the charity that
seeks to separate its business activity through a subsidiary
corporation risks exposure to the constraints of the Internal
Revenue Code‘s provisions regulating nonprofits.
4.

The Non-Distribution Constraint

Finally, while the exclusivity test under § 501(c)(3) is a most
obvious hazard for nonprofits supported by commercial activity,
the Code‘s private inurement prohibition might also pose a threat

74

For a discussion on the evolution of private foundation regulation, see
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 20, at 760–62.
75
For a discussion of enterprise entity theory (enterprise liability), see
CHIAPPINELLI, supra note 73, at 284–85.
76
Id. at 284–85.
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to a charity‘s nonprofit state if it engages in business activity. 77
Private inurement is the sine qua non of for-profit activity; the
purpose of commercial enterprise is to generate a return on the
owner‘s investment—net profit in the form of dividends in a
corporate form of doing business, along with an appreciating value
of the enterprise owned. As noted before, though, § 501(c)(3)
prohibits profit generated by a nonprofit to be paid over to
―insiders‖ within the association. Thus, as public charities ally
themselves with commercial enterprise they must be wary of the
―no private inurement‖ prohibition, especially with regard to
compensation paid to employees and other insiders.78
Without question, commercial activity can be a crucial
financial resource for nonprofits that are faced with important
societal problems that are not being addressed by the two other
sectors, but lack sufficient income from traditional sources to meet
the challenge. At the same time, putting aside a pragmatic
consideration of which of the three sectors is best suited to manage
a particular societal problem, hazards lurk in the federal tax code
for nonprofits engaged in business activity. Moreover, and in
addition to the statutory hazards discussed above, commercial
activity may jeopardize the status of nonprofits in other respects. A
review of the various kinds of nonprofit/entrepreneurial activity
that we observe today and the risks business activity poses, both
within and beyond the Internal Revenue Code, will illustrate the
point.
III. CATEGORIES OF COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY BY NONPROFITS: THEIR
CHARACTERISTICS, ADVANTAGES, AND DOWNSIDE RISKS
Scholars and journalists have reported extensively on the
significant increase in commercial activity by nonprofit
associations.79 As these texts demonstrate, there are several ways
77

See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (2006).
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
79
See, e.g., TO PROFIT OR NOT TO PROFIT: THE COMMERCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR (Burton A. Weisbrod ed.,
Cambridge University Press 2000); NONPROFITS & BUSINESS: A NEW WORLD
OF INNOVATION AND ADAPTATION (Joseph J. Cordes & C. Eugene Steuerle eds.,
78
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to categorize and analyze the various kinds of nonprofit/business
activity. 80 This Article employs a template based upon the way
nonprofits treat their business activity and it identifies five types of
structures nonprofits use for their businesses.
A. Type 1
A nonprofit may confine its for-profit activity to business
activity that is integral to its mission—for example, selling tickets
to opera productions sponsored by a nonprofit opera group, or
charging tuition and fees to students enrolled in a nonprofit college
or university. 81 Similarly, a nonprofit may conduct for-profit
business activity that the IRS would consider so closely-related to
the charitable mission that it is not ―unrelated‖ to its mission and,
therefore, will escape UBIT—for example, an art appreciation
organization formed to educate the public about art by selling
artwork at its gallery. 82
These kinds of commercial activities are not likely to run afoul
of the federal tax code, as long as a related purpose is identified
within one of the charitable categories mentioned in Part II.83 But
perhaps it should not be enough for a nonprofit to claim merely a
patent affinity with a charitable mission. Professor Colombo
advances this argument. An example that he gives to illustrate the
point is that of a nonprofit hospital—facially a public charity and
traditionally considered to be so because it appears,
unquestionably, to fit into the charitable categories as it is related
The Urban Institute 2008); Colombo, Reforming I.R.C. Provisions, supra note 1,
at 667–68 (identifying several media reports and scholarly texts analyzing the
phenomenon); Fishman, supra note 1, at 571–72.
80
See, e.g., Colombo, Reforming I.R.C. Provisions, supra note 1, at 683
(separating the spectrum into five categories).
81
See, e.g., Goldsboro Art League v. Comm‘r, 75 T.C. 337, 346 (1980).
While the express rationale for the ruling in Goldsboro was premised on the
exclusivity test, the court also stated that art sales assisted the Art League‘s
charitable mission of art education. Id. at 343–44. In that sense, it can be said
that sales of artwork, while commercial in nature, were not unrelated to the
League‘s exempt purpose.
82
Id.
83
See supra Part II.
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to serving the advancement of health. 84 But if, as is often the case
in today‘s economy, nonprofit hospitals operate in a way that is
―virtually identical to for-profit hospitals in similar markets,‖85
Colombo observes that the commercial activity of selling their
health care services for a fee appears not to qualify as an activity
substantially related to a charitable purpose. Furthermore, its
mission should have difficulty surviving an ―exclusivity‖ analysis;
in Internal Revenue Service parlance, it should not be considered
to have passed the ―operational test.‖86 The reason that nonprofits
operating like for-profit hospitals escape operational test analysis
has largely to do with a slippage or liberalization in the regulatory
standards the Service has applied to hospitals over time. 87
84

Colombo, Reforming I.R.C. Provisions, supra note 1, at 683–84; see also
John D. Colombo, The Failure of Community Benefit, 15 HEALTH MATRIX 29,
30–37 (2005).
85
Colombo, Reforming I.R.C. Provisions, supra note 1, at 683–84.
86
See NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 20, at 351–52; Colombo,
Reforming I.R.C. Provisions, supra note 1, at 597.
87
As Fishman and Schwarz explain:
When § 501(c)(3) was first enacted, most nonprofit hospitals operated
like traditional charities by treating indigent patients and relying on
volunteer labor. The Service‘s first articulation of a standard for
hospital tax exemptions was consistent with this traditional concept of
charitable. In a 1956 ruling, the Service relied on ―relief of poverty‖ as
the underlying rationale for exemption and required a tax-exempt
hospital to treat indigent patients without regard to their ability to pay.
Rev. Ruling 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202 . . . . [In 1969,] the Service
discarded the charity care requirement, replacing it with a community
benefit standard that mirrored the ―charitable‖ concept articulated in the
1969 Treasury Regulations.
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 20, at 384. The 1969 ruling, Rev.
Ruling 69-545, stated that the revised standard, ―community benefit‖—which
relied on the traditional charitable categories of education and promotion of
health but diminished the importance of relief—retained a vestige of the poverty
relief standard. It required nonprofit hospitals to provide emergency room
services. However, boutique hospitals (hospitals specializing in a certain kind of
healthcare: plastic surgery, cancer treatment, etc.) were an exemption from the
emergency room care requirement as long as they passed other tests that assured
the Service they were, somehow, providing a community benefit. As matters
now stand, the Service—in the face of the onslaught of HMOs in the 1990s—
has modified its liberalized standard regarding health care facilities but has

BUCHOLTZ_6-5-09

426

6/6/2009 12:35 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

Nevertheless, society derives no benefit from conferring nonprofit
status on for-profit commerce simply because it can make a facial
claim to be a charity. The pragmatic scrutiny Colombo advocates
makes good public policy sense.
Hospitals, though, are not the only entities claiming nonprofit
status that deserve closer scrutiny. In a larger context, all fee-forservice nonprofits and those in which business activities are
closely related to a facially charitable mission should undergo the
same pragmatic scrutiny to ascertain whether and to what extent:
1. They operate more as for-profits than as charities;
2. Their designation as § 501(c)(3) charities tends to dilute
or compromise the designation and its public policy
rationale; and
3. The mission itself would be best performed by a forprofit institution or a governmental counterpart rather than
a nonprofit. The salient questions are: what is it that society
requires from hospitals and other fee-for-service nonprofits
or business activities related to a charitable mission, and—
given the characteristics of each sector—which is more
likely to perform those functions adequately?
This analytical template should be applied to all fee-for-service
charities and those with related commercial activities. 88 While
never returned to the traditional standard. Id. at 392–93. For a detailed
description of the current standard, see IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Comm‘r, 325
F.3d 1188, 1198 (10th Cir. 2003).
88
Fee-for-services have represented a significant proportion of
commercially-generated revenues for nonprofit association. Since 1977—well
before the downsizing of government and the wave of new commercial
enterprises by nonprofits that followed in its wake—established nonprofit
theaters reported that two-thirds of their incomes were generated by their feefor-services box office tickets. Robert J. Anderson, Jr. & Sonia P. Malfezou, The
Economic Condition of the Live Professional Theatre in America, in RESEARCH
IN THE ARTS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON POLICY RELATED STUDIES
OF THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT OF THE ARTS 63–65 (1977). That figure seems
to have remained stable even after government downsizing. In 2000, the IRS
reported that fee-for-service income represents about two-thirds of nonprofit
budgets. Michael H. Shuman & Marrian Fuller, Profits for Justice, NATION, Jan.
24, 2005, at 13–14 (discussing fee-for-service revenues from tuition fees for
students matriculating in a private nonprofit university and membership dues for
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existing analytical tests, like the ―commensurate in scope‖ test,
shed some light on the primary purpose and operational realities, it
is important to extend the analysis beyond the scope of the Code
and its regulations to policy concerns about the integrity of the
nonprofit sector and pragmatic concerns about each sector‘s
aptitude to undertake a particular societal challenge.
B. Type 2
Fee-for-service revenues are synonymous with or closely
related to a charity‘s mission, but a second category of the way a
nonprofit structures its business activity may be totally unrelated to
its mission. An example of this kind of commercial activity
engages the nonprofit in lending its reputation to support a
business enterprise in exchange for an often substantial fee. A
notable collaboration of this kind was that of the American
Medical Association, which bound itself contractually to Sunbeam
Corporation to endorse Sunbeam‘s products in exchange for
lucrative endorsement fees. 89 Not surprisingly, these kinds of
collaborations raise concerns that an endorsement could jeopardize
the reputation and credibility of the nonprofit, or even undermine
its mission. One could reasonably inquire: does the American
Medical Association really believe that all of Sunbeam‘s
appliances offer an unalloyed health benefit to the American
public? If not, does the diminution in its credibility, reputation and
even its mission constitute a poor bargain for the income received
from the endorsement?
The flipside of endorsements by nonprofits of for-profit
business is sponsorships by for-profits to support nonprofit
missions. While both kinds of collaborations may offer substantial
revenues to the nonprofit, sponsorships appear to cause less
health clubs owned and operated by YMCAs and YWCAs).
89
Burton A. Weisbrod, The Nonprofit Mission and Its Financing: Growing
Links Between Nonprofits and the Rest of the Economy, in TO PROFIT OR NOT TO
PROFIT: THE COMMERCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR 1, 2
(Cambridge University Press 1998). It should be noted, however, that the
American Medical Association is a nonprofit trade association, a § 501(c)(6)
organization and not a § 501(c)(3) organization.
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reputational concern.
However, they may trigger UBIT.
Sponsorships, since the 1990s, have become increasingly visible,
especially in the world of college sports.90 But they also abound in
the larger nonprofit universe. 91 The Service initially found them to
be more than mere ―donor acknowledgments‖ and, therefore,
taxable under UBIT.92 But Congress, acceding to public pressure,
carved out an exception to UBIT for what it deemed ―Qualified
Sponsorship Payments‖ (―QSPs‖) at § 513(i) of the Code. 93 QSPs
90

In Tech Adv. Memo 9147007, the Service ruled that income received by
nonprofits in, for example, the naming of sporting events were taxable. In the
Memo, the Mobil Cotton Bowl and the John Hancock Bowl were the specific
sporting events considered by the Service. The Service decided that the signs
and memorabilia associated with the events, and bearing the name of the
businesses, were tantamount to valuable advertising for the businesses. A rather
benign example is given in the following news item:
Forget about getting a building named after yourself. The cash-strapped
Scripps Institution of Oceanography is offering what might be an even
better deal to someone looking to make a mark in history: A rare
hydrothermal vent worm will forever be emblazoned with your name if
you fork over $50,000. For those on a smaller budget, a mere $15,000
will land you in the annals of marine biology as the namesake of an
orange, speckled nudibranch, also known as a sea slug.
Randy Dotinga, Want to Name a Sea Slug? A Nonprofit Might Let You.,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jun. 23, 2008, at 14, available at
http://features.csmonitor.com/environment/2008/06/25/want-to-name-a-seaslug-a-nonprofit-might-let-you. Members of the scientific community look
askance at the name-for-money game as compromising, but scientific
institutions undergoing financial crises feel compelled to play the game.
Every year there‘s a little bit less money to go around . . . . Institutions
that rely on federal funds to keep their research going are finding it
much tougher to get that money and are having to get creative in either
finding other sources or rethinking what kinds of research they do.
Id. (quoting Kei Koizumi, director of the American Association for the
Advancement of Science‘s Research & Development budget and policy
program). Professors whose office doors are graced with a metal plaque
appearing to name the office for some august donor are reminded of the game on
a daily basis.
91
Examples are ―donor acknowledgments‖ that may appear on brochures
or invitations announcing a nonprofit event supported by named donors.
92
See Fishman, supra note 1.
93
Under the statute, nonprofits can receive revenues from sponsorships
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permit a limited amount of exposure for the sponsor as long as it
does not amount to ―advertising.‖
Advertising revenues are another form of nonprofit/for-profit
collaboration. Typical examples are for-profit advertising revenues
generated by nonprofit publications.94 Advertising income is often
a necessary supplement for financing nonprofit publications.
Subscription income alone rarely generates enough money to
sustain an educational, professional or scholarly journal. But courts
have not found the apparent necessity of advertising revenues
sufficient reason for these revenues to escape UBIT. UBIT
analyzes nonprofit revenues under a three-part test:
1. Is the activity generating the revenue a ―trade or
business?‖ If not, there is no tax. If it is a trade or business,
2. Is it ―regularly carried on?‖ If not, there is no tax. If it is
a trade or business regularly carried on,
3. Is it ―substantially related‖ to the organization‘s exempt
purposes? If it is, there is no tax. If not, UBIT applies and
the income will be taxed at business income tax rates.95
―Trades or businesses‖ are considered to be activities intended
to generate profit.96 ―Regularly carried on‖ looks to the regularity
with which for-profit enterprises carry on the activity. 97 Both are
relatively straightforward tests. The ―substantially related‖ test is
without income tax consequences (UBIT) as long as the sponsor‘s return benefit
consists of nothing more than the public identification of its name, symbol or
other identifying information along with other ―insubstantial‖ benefits, defined
as benefits that are valued at no more than 2% of the sponsorship contribution.
Based upon those parameters, ―name the species‖ fundraisers for scientific
nonprofits, like Scripps Institution of Oceanography, can escape UBIT for the
$15,000 it will receive from a donor who, in turn, can get a sea slug named for
him. Dotinga, supra note 90, at 14.
94
See, e.g., United States v. Am. Coll. of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834, 847
(1986) (rejecting a per se rule to tax all commercial revenue from
advertisements for tax-exempt journals but insisting that advertising revenues
were taxable income).
95
Internal Revenue Service, Unrelated Business Income Defined,
http://www.irs.gov/charities/article/0,,id=96104,00.html (last visited Mar. 1,
2009).
96
Id.
97
Id.
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somewhat more difficult to grasp and has been interpreted by
Treasury‘s regulations to mean that the business income must
―contribute importantly‖ to the nonprofit mission of the charity,
and the contribution must be more than revenues. 98 Under that
analysis, advertising will usually fail the ―substantially related
test,‖ but not as a per se rule.99 Nonetheless, UBIT income from
advertising will not cause the entire mission-driven enterprise in
which it is generated to fail the UBIT test. Rather, Congress has
adopted the Service‘s ―fragmentation‖ test by which the two
sources of income (subscription fees and advertising revenues, for
example) are to be treated separately. 100 The ―contribute
importantly‖ and ―fragmentation‖ rules also apply to other forms
of business income that is a part of, but not subsumed by, the
charitable activity. 101
A final example of commonly structured collaborative
activities between nonprofits and for-profits and their UBIT
implications are revenues generated ―passively‖ by the nonprofit
for some benefit it confers upon a business. Common examples are
affinity credit cards (credit cards that bear the name and/or logo of
a nonprofit—like a university) or rentals of the nonprofits‘
membership lists. Generally, UBIT has excluded from its purview
passive investment income. 102 Passive investment income has
traditionally encompassed income generated by investments in forprofit businesses (dividends and capital gains on sales of securities
unless the securities are leveraged), rents (limited to rental income
from real estate and from personal property but only if it is
identified within the real estate rental agreement and is incidental
to it) and royalties (limited to income generated from revenues for
98

Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(2) (2006).
See Fraternal Order of Police Ill. State Troopers Lodge No. 41 v.
Comm‘r, 87 T.C. 747, 756 (1986) (finding that advertising was ―obviously
conducted with a profit motive‖).
100
Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (codified at
26 U.S.C. § 513 (c)).
101
Examples include commercial products sold in a museum gift shop
(taxable income) along with art-related items (nontaxable income). See Rev.
Rul. 73-105, 19731 C.B. 264.
102
See generally I.R.C. § 512 (a)–(b) (2006).
99
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the right to use intangible property, like copyrights and
trademarks).103
Assuming that a nonprofit passes § 501(c)(3) muster, and that
UBIT has done a good job of properly carving out commercial
activity not entitled to the income tax exemption, 104 the challenges
to this type of commercial activity (collaborative efforts totally
unrelated to the exempt purpose of the nonprofit) are:
a. Do they compromise the nonprofit‘s reputation or its
credibility and;
b. To what extent is their provenance to be found in a
public policy dominated by ideological considerations at
the expense of practical considerations. That is to say, are
nonprofits driven to embrace all kinds of fundraising
gimmicks because government services and support have
been so severely curtailed?;
c. A related issue is whether these entrepreneurial
gymnastics contribute to ―mission drift‖ by ineluctably
introducing a partial ―mission shift.‖ More pointedly, does
fundraising become a dominant mission of the nonprofit
when traditional sources of income prove inadequate?
C. Type 3
A third type of structure for generating nonprofit revenues
from commercial activity is situated between the fee-for-services
or substantially related businesses that are integral to the
nonprofit‘s operation (type 1) and the occasional collaborations
with businesses that are extraneous to the charitable mission and its
operations (type 2). In type 3 structures, the nonprofit seeks a
closer connection with an unrelated business but tries to avoid
103

See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1245-1 (1976), 1.512(b)-1(a) to (b) (1992); Sierra
Club, Inc. v. Comm‘r, 86 F.3d 1526, 1532 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing the
passivity requirement as it applies to rents such as mailing list rentals and
―royalties‖ from affinity credit cards).
104
For a challenge to UBIT, see Michael S. Knoll, The UBIT: Leveling an
Uneven Playing Field or Tilting a Level One?, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 857
(2007).
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being subsumed by it. Joint ventures, either of the contractual
variety or those deemed to be partnerships, are common examples
of this type of income-generating structure. In the United States,
most well publicized instances of this sort of commercial activity
occur in the health care industry. 105 Over time, a variety of joint
venture structures have evolved and the I.R.S. has developed a less
rigid, more nuanced approach to evaluating the tax law
consequences of these structures.106 Ultimately the Service is
105

Other industries where joint ventures have proved to be attractive
structures for financial support include low income housing nonprofits and
higher education joint ventures. Judy Kindell, IRS & T.J. Sullivan, Gardner,
Carton & Douglas, IRS‘ Judy Kindell Discusses Joint Ventures after Rev. Rul.
2004-51, Remarks Before the Annual Tax Program of American Health
Lawyers Association (Oct. 21, 2004), in 10 EO TAX J. 40 (2005). An example of
a joint venture of a contractual nature in higher education was the contract
between the University of California at Irvine and Capella University, an online
for-profit university, in which Capella paid U.C. Irvine $500 per student referred
to it. While considered legal by the U.S. Department of Education, the
arrangement met with criticisms that it compromised the reputation and integrity
of the public university and raised conflict-of-interest issues. Paul Basken, U. of
California Campus Benefits from Referring Students to Profit College, Sept. 28,
2007, available at http://www.calstate.edu/pa/clips2007/september/28sept/
refer.shtml.
106
See NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra, note 20, at 711–43 (providing a
lucid review of the evolution of joint venture forms and the Service‘s evolving
attitude toward them). One typical illustration of joint ventures that emerged in
the 1980s in the health care industry was the ―whole charity‖ merger, in which a
§ 501(c)(3) hospital would transfer all of its assets and activities to a joint
venture business entity in exchange for an interest in the new entity, while a forprofit business would contribute cash to receive a similar ownership interest in
the entity. Courts ruled that the nonprofit retained its tax-exempt status as a
§ 501(c) organization only if it maintained dominant control over policy issues
in the operation of the new (joint venture) entity. See, e.g., St. David‘s Health
Care Sys. v. United States, 349 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 2003). That is to say, the
charitable mission of the nonprofit, not wealth maximization, must be the
prevailing concern of the joint venture. Id. at 237–38. Thus, the issue of control
can jeopardize the tax-exempt status of the nonprofit and cause it to be
subsumed within a dominantly profit-driven enterprise.
Complex legal structures can hide the reality of power retained by the forprofit entity. And that should not surprise us. When nonprofit organizations
partner with for-profit businesses, relative bargaining power inherently resides
in the for-profit enterprise. In St. David’s, the court stated,
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The present case illustrates why, when a nonprofit organization forms a
partnership with a for-profit entity, courts should be concerned about
the relinquishment of control. St. David‘s, by its own account, entered
the partnership with HCA [the for-profit company] out of financial
necessity (to obtain revenues needed for it to stay afloat). HCA, by
contrast, entered the partnership for reasons of financial convenience
(to enter a new market). The starkly different financial position of these
two parties at the beginning of their partnership negotiations
undoubtedly affected their relative bargaining strength. Because St.
David‘s ―needed‖ this partnership more than HCA, St. David‘s may
have been willing to acquiesce to many (if not most) of HCA‘s
demands for the Final Partnership Agreement. In the process, of course,
St. David‘s may not have been able to ensure that its partnership with
HCA would continually (sic.) provide a ―public benefit‖ as opposed to
a private benefit for HCA.
Id. at 247. Another form of joint venture that was developed was called
―ancillary‖ because the charity, itself, was not integrated within the joint
venture, but rather maintained its separate status and partnered with a for-profit
in an ―ancillary‖ business venture by transferring part of its assets, services or
money to the venture. See Rev. Rul. 04-51, 2004-1 C.B. 974. The Service lent
its imprimatur to ancillary joint ventures under the same basic control guidelines
it has maintained for ―whole charity‖ joint ventures. Id. This revenue ruling
involved a 50-50 joint venture between a university and a for-profit company.
The venture was a distance learning program in which the university controlled
the curriculum and the faculty appointments while the for-profit contributed its
expertise in how to run a distance program through interactive video. The
Service approved the joint venture under both the exclusivity test and UBIT in
spite of the 50-50 structure because the university retained control of the exempt
purpose: education. Id. Where the nonprofit retains control over a § 501(c)(3)
purpose, the Service‘s analysis is fairly straightforward. This is particularly the
case where the joint venture represents only a small part of the operations of the
nonprofit (an ―ancillary‖ operation). However, where the expertise each entity
brings to the venture is the same (a for-profit hospital and a nonprofit hospital; a
for-profit university and a nonprofit university) then the control issue is more
complex and ownership shares and managerial power become more important,
and the legal outcome for the nonprofit less predictable. Complexity arises not
just from the substantial ownership and management provisions but from the
structure under which the venture operates (LLC; general partnership; limited
partnership; joint venture of the partnership model vs. joint venture of the
contract model) because state governance laws may differ and ―in many cases
the critical questions are not addressed by state laws, regulations or cases.‖
Kindell & Sullivan, supra, note 105, at 33. For a discussion of the Service‘s
informal guidelines for LLC exempt organizations, see Bradley T. Borden,
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concerned with whether the joint venture, as it is structured and
operated, is primarily driven by a tax-exempt purpose
(―exclusivity‖ rule); 2) engaged in businesses not substantially
related to that purpose (UBIT); and 3) whether distribution of
profits violates the private benefit constraint (―non-distribution‖ or
―no private inurement‖ rule).107
To be sure, joint ventures can be a lucrative source of revenues,
but they come with certain risks:
1. The risk that the nonprofit might lose its exempt status;
2. Or that its gain from nonexempt sources of income might
be significantly reduced by UBIT;
3. Or that the culture of the organization might shift away
from one driven by charitable ends to one driven by
profitable means (a subtle but discernible transformation in
the organization‘s culture usually called ―mission drift‖);
4. Or that its association‘s close relationship with a
business partner might result in some loss of reputation.
D. Type 4
A fourth type of business activity is a structural alternative to
the mission drift, reputational and regulatory risks associated with
type 3 joint ventures. Through structural formalities, parentsubsidiary arrangements help the nonprofit (―parent‖ organization)
distance itself from the for-profit enterprise that sustains it.108 Type
4 is a clear instance of the deference courts have traditionally
shown to the formal organization structures businesses elect to
form under corporate governance laws. 109 As discussed earlier in
this Article, the general rule is that courts will honor the corporate

Limited Liability Companies as Exempt Organizations, 33 ESTS. GIFTS & TRS. J.
150 (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1142924.
107
See supra p. 111.
108
In addition to separating itself from the subsidiary business to protect
itself from the risks associated with type 3 structures, nonprofit parent
organizations might also reap tax and liability exposure advantages from the use
of subsidiary businesses they control.
109
See generally supra Part II.B.2.
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formalities of state corporate governance laws that separate a
corporation from its owners and affiliates against appeals by
creditors to ―pierce the corporate veil‖ of limited liability (that
generally shields owners and affiliates from the liabilities of a
corporation) unless the case reveals that the corporation‘s structure
protects fraud or similar wrongdoing which the shield of limited
liability was not intended to protect.110
In the very different legal context of the federal code, courts
have adopted the same kind of deference. 111 The corporate ―shield‖
between a for-profit subsidiary and its nonprofit owner will not be
―pierced‖: they will not be treated as one entity and the business
activities of the subsidiary will not be attributed to the charity
absent probative evidence of the same kinds of deception that lead
courts under state corporate governance laws to pierce the
corporate veil. Nonetheless, Congress has considered eliminating
the shield for a controlled subsidiary of a nonprofit parent
organization and that legislative policy change may yet be
realized. 112 In any event and in the absence of that kind of
legislation, subsidiary businesses have become an increasingly
prevalent venue for sustaining the charitable projects of nonprofits.
Michael H. Shuman and Merrian Fuller have described the
phenomenon. 113 In type 4 organizations, a business entity (the
subsidiary, typically a for-profit corporation) simply runs its
business and distributes net profits (dividends) to its nonprofit
owner (the parent corporation that owns its shares). A successful
example of this model is the Used Book Café in New York, a forprofit, wholly owned subsidiary of its parent corporation, Housing

110

Id.
See, e.g., Molive Props., Inc. v. Comm‘r, 319 U.S. 436, 439 (1943). But
see Orange County Agric. Soc‘y v. Comm‘r, 893 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1990).
112
See generally NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 20, at 710–11,
744–50 (discussing the Draft Report of the Subcommittee on Oversight of the
House Ways and Means Committee on proposed revisions of UBIT, 100th
Cong. 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1988)). Fishman and Schwarz comment, ―This and
other proposals were never enacted, but the controversy over complex structures
lingers as a major policy issue in the law of tax-exempt organizations.‖ Id. at
710.
113
Shuman & Fuller, supra note 88, at 13–14.
111
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Works, a nonprofit association that assists homeless people with
HIV/AIDS. Shuman & Fuller have described the relationship
between the two entities this way:
Used Book Café . . . an independent bookstore . . . enjoys
regular visits from leading agents and publishers in the city
and boasts a fabulous events calendar that reads like a
Who‘s Who of contemporary writers and musicians.
What‘s truly revolutionary about the café, however, is that
[since 2004] the business, along with sister thrift shops,
provided [annually] more than $2 million to its parent
nonprofit, Housing Works . . . .114
This fourth option seems to offer a ―new paradigm‖ for
commercial activity by charities without the downside risks of the
other three options. The new paradigm separates the for-profit
activity from the nonprofit mission by establishing a subsidiary
business entity, owned by, but legally separate from, the nonprofit
parent corporation. The legal separation of the two entities
alleviates some of the problems associated with the other forms of
commercial activity by nonprofits. Because the nonprofit has no
direct legal control over the subsidiary‘s operations, 115 there is no
compromise of the nonprofit‘s reputation.116 Because the
subsidiary‘s business income is taxed before it distributes its net
profits to the nonprofit parent, there is no UBIT tax problem that
could arise if the nonprofit generated the business income itself.117
Because the subsidiary exerts no control over the parent nonprofit,

114

Id. at 13.
Shareholders (owners) of corporations do not run the operations of the
corporation under state corporate governance laws. Rather, the company is
managed by executives hired by the Board of Directors who are accountable to
it. See generally JESSE CHOPER, JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & RONALD J. GILSON,
BASIC NORMS AND DUTIES FOR MANAGEMENT OF CORPORATIONS: CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 55 (Coth ed., Aspen 2004).
116
By stark contrast, the AMA‘s lucrative endorsement of Sunbeam‘s
products is a clear example of commercial activity that was damaging to the
nonprofit‘s reputation. See supra note 89.
117
However, collaborations between nonprofits and for-profit businesses,
along with fee-for-services, can result in UBIT exposure. See supra notes 81–86
and accompanying text.
115
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there is no business dominance or control problem of the kind
associated with joint ventures and other types of partnerships.118
The business entity simply runs its separate commercial activity
and distributes net profits (dividends) to its nonprofit owner. This
model of a nonprofit sustaining itself through commercial activity
appears to be an idea whose time has come; the current era of antigovernment bias necessitates that nonprofits expand their services
while simultaneously meeting the increased financial requirements
of an ever-expanding nonprofit sector without tarnishing its
reputation, shifting nonprofits‘ attention away from their charitable
mission or jeopardizing their legal status. That said, there are
downside risks to this model of entrepreneurship as well.
Unlike the other three options, the parent-subsidiary model
appears to pose none of the legal, reputational or mission drift
problems because the structured separation of the entities seems to
protect the nonprofit from any taint of profit-driven motives.
However, even this otherwise promising model may compromise a
fundamental public interest. Nonprofits, under § 501(c)(3), are
deemed to be ―public benefit‖ organizations. 119 That is, they
supply some important service to the public by their charitable
works. And this notion of ―public benefit‖ is often used to justify
the various tax advantages the law affords § 501(c)(3) charitable
organizations. As explained in Part II, above, tax advantages
supply the consideration for the nonprofits and act as the ―quid pro
quo‖ for the ―public benefit‖ society derives from their charitable
works.120 But who determines which specific projects from the vast
array of societal problems that might be addressed should be
selected? Should the public have any voice in these kinds of
decisions? In that regard, and as addressed in Part II, the parentsubsidiary model can be seen as analogous to private foundations
because it raises similar concerns. Congress originally treated
private foundations like other § 501(c)(3) organizations. 121 But in
the 1960s, Congress became concerned that private foundations

118
119
120
121

See I.R.C. §§ 512(a)–(b) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.512(b)-(1)(a) (2006).
See I.R.C. § 501(c) (2006).
See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (2006).
Marsh, supra note 63, at 138–39.
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were deriving ―public benefit‖ status without any input or
influence from the public itself. 122 In a democracy, Congress
reasoned, the citizens at large (or, at least the relevant community
of citizens) should have a voice in determining what kind of
nonprofit activity is a ―public benefit.‖ Congress thus ratcheted up
the regulation regime for monitoring and directing the activities of
private (grant-making) foundations and it diminished the
unfettered power of ―operating foundations‖ to act without public
influence.123 Congress did so by requiring operating foundations to
accede to public opinion about the selection of their public benefit
projects. Public opinion enters the decision-making process in two
ways: operating foundations must put a certain number of outsiders
(members of the public) on their boards and a certain percent of
their capital must come from public donations.124
Like these foundations, a self-sustaining nonprofit that can
generate all of its financial support from its own for-profit
subsidiary runs the risk of being charged with a kind of solipsism:
it no longer needs public financial support in the form of individual
donations or government and institutional grants. Thus, there is no
longer any financial incentive for the nonprofit to reach out to
constituents in the community to participate, as members of the
governing board or as donors, in formulating the nonprofit‘s
policies or in monitoring its operations. Therefore, like a private
foundation, within its self-selected mission it has inordinate power
to decide which charitable projects most benefit the public. It
seems reasonable to predict that, as was the case with private
grant-making and operating foundations, their otherwise enviable
position as self-sustaining will eventually subject them to public
outcry, public scrutiny and government regulation.
E. Type 5
Certainly the most innovative of recent nonprofit efforts to

122

Id. at 148.
See I.R.C. §§ 507–09 (2009)
124
See NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 20, at 596, 753–54, 760–
62; ALLEN, KRAAKMAN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 55, at 322–23.
123
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engage in commercial activity in order to sustain their charitable
activities is the ―social business‖ or ―social enterprise.‖ Charles
King, speaking on behalf of the Social Enterprise Alliance, a group
that advocates new venues for making nonprofits self-sustaining
has said, ―What we are about . . . is the business of changing the
entire paradigm by which not-for-profits operate and generate the
capital they need to carry out their mission—a new paradigm based
on sustainability and social entrepreneurship.‖125 Many new forms
of commercial endeavors might logically be called ―social
enterprises‖ but the most revolutionary form of the paradigm is a
very specific kind of entrepreneurship: an organization (for profit
or nonprofit) that identifies a disadvantaged segment or group in a
population and seeks to transform (not merely ameliorate) the
living conditions of that group by developing a sustainable
commercial opportunity for them or by otherwise providing an exit
route from an untenable situation. This form of a social business is
distinguishable from a for-profit commercial enterprise because its
mission is not to generate profit for its investors but to meet a
―social objective‖ of transforming the capacity of underprivileged
populations to escape poverty and other debilitating conditions. 126
At the same time, this form of social entrepreneurship can be
distinguished from a traditional social services charity which seeks
to aid and assist with funding that may derive from business profits
(as well as from donations and grants) but not to transform the
disadvantaged group through commercial enterprise.
It should be emphasized, however, that this emergent form of
self-sustaining organizations, like the competing terms for and
definitions of the Third Sector, (―nonprofits,‖ the U.S. term; or
―NGOs,‖ the E.U. term) may go by different names which
generally describe the same kind of entity but may also imply
distinct characteristics that make an analytical difference. 127 Thus,
125

See Shuman & Fuller, supra note 113, at 13.
See Muhammed Yunus, The Nobel Peace Prize 2006: Nobel Lecture, 13
L. & BUS. REV. AM. 267 (2007).
127
See Gibelman & Gelman, supra note 3, at 357; see also Jean Proulx,
Denis Bourque & Sebastien Savard, The Government - Third Sector Interface in
Quebec, 18 VOLUNTAS: INT‘L J. VOLUNTARY & NONPROFIT ORGS. 293, 295 n.1
(2007) (noting that the U.S. term of ―nonprofit‖ and the E.U. term of ―NGO‖
126
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while the most revolutionary form is described above by the
narrow definition of social business or social enterprise so as to
distinguish it from typical business forms in the for-profit sector
and from other kinds of commercial activities by nonprofits, the
larger context of empirical research describes two broader but
somewhat different perspectives on social businesses: the U.S.
model and the E.U. model. It may be instructive to describe these
two broader definitions in order to clarify the challenges social
businesses face.128 Both the U.S. understanding and the E.U.
perspective view social businesses as nongovernmental, marketbased approaches to address social issues.‖ 129 Empirical studies,
however, indicate that the U.S. perspective emphasizes the
―revenue generation‖ aspect of social enterprise while the
European tradition emphasizes a ―social economy‖ or cooperative
aspect of social enterprise. The European tradition is foreign to
U.S. sensibilities but deeply rooted in the historical antecedents of
the European model. 130 Thus, social enterprise in Europe can be
seen as an outgrowth of the cooperative movement—an antiauthoritarian labor movement. In Europe, the emphasis is on
participation in governance by the enterprise‘s beneficiaries and on
social and employment objectives, which goes well beyond the
U.S. emphasis on revenue generation. 131
Research also indicates that within the U.S., academia
conceptualizes social enterprise somewhat differently: scholars,
especially within leading business schools, tend to situate social
enterprise within the category of for-profit businesses that engage,
connote two different research traditions: ―‗an American tradition stressing nonlucrativity‘‖ and ―‗a European tradition stressing collective entrepreneurship and
identifying the third sector with social economy‘‖ (references omitted)).
128
An excellent article illuminating the differences between the U.S. and
E.U. traditions is Janelle A. Kerlin, Social Enterprise in the United States and
Europe: Understanding and Learning from the Differences, 17 VOLUNTAS:
INT‘L J. VOLUNTARY & NONPROFIT ORGS. 247 (2006).
129
Id. at 247.
130
Id. at 25153.
131
Id. at 250. For an historical perspective on the evolution of the European
model, see generally Heydemann, supra note 6, at 20, 22 (noting how
differences in national experiences help to explain differences in national
models of nonprofit associations).
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at some level, with social issues or causes. Practitioners, on the
other hand, think of social businesses as organized under
§ 501(c)(3) operating charities.132 The practitioners‘ version of the
U.S. model seems to fit the use of social enterprise in the 1970s
when nonprofits developed businesses to generate jobs for the
unemployed. That model was expanded during the decade of the
1970s when the economy suffered a downturn and the government
began to downsize. To make up for shortages in financing from
government, nonprofits expanded the model to sustain their social
services work during that decade. Today, the social
entrepreneurship model continues to expand, taking different forms
and adopting different goals: nonprofit vs. for-profit; job-creation
vs. mission support; revenue-generation vs. community
development or transformation of the living conditions of a
targeted group, and so forth.133
Like the four other types of commercial activity by nonprofits,
the social business has proven to be an effective way for charities
to sustain themselves and their missions in an era where
government downsizing has deprived them of an important source
of support. But like the other four types of (entirely or partially)
self-sustaining nonprofits, they too face challenges and risks.
Those risks and challenges may vary with the choice among the
different social enterprise models identified above. An obvious
132

Kerlin, supra note 128, at 251.
Examples of the various kinds of social businesses abound. Perhaps the
most famous are the Grameen businesses pioneered by Muhammad Yunus who
won the Nobel Peace Prize for his microcredit bank Grameen Bank, which he
founded along with Grameen Shakti of Grameen Energy, which has brought
renewable energy to Bangladesh; Grameen Kalyan (Grameen Welfare) bringing
affordable healthcare to the poor in Bangladesh, which has spawned a network
of for-profit and nonprofit social businesses dedicated to transforming the health
of the poor; and recently Grameen Danone, a social business partnership with
Groupe Danone, the French yogurt conglomerate, which provides low cost
highly nutritious food for the poor. For an overview of Yunus‘ pioneering and
very successful work in social businesses, see generally MUHAMMAD YUNUS,
CREATING A WORLD WITHOUT POVERTY: SOCIAL BUSINESS AND THE FUTURE OF
CAPITALISM (Public Affairs-Perseus Books 2007). See also PHIL SMITH & ERIC
THURMAN, A BILLION BOOTSTRAPS: MICROCREDIT, BAREFOOT BANKING AND
THE BUSINESS SOLUTION FOR ENDING POVERTY (McGraw-Hill 2007).
133
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example is the form the entrepreneurs select: when creating a
nonprofit social enterprise, they must consider whether or to what
extent their enterprise will be jeopardized by the exclusivity test or
by UBIT taxation discussed in Section A of Part II above. 134 If, on
the other hand, they elect to form the enterprise as a for-profit,
while they will avoid the limitations of the tax code for
§ 501(c)(3), they may run the risks of mission drift and diminution
of the credibility and reputation that § 501(c)(3) organizations
appear to enjoy. 135 Moreover, scholars have identified the
following problems confronting every form of social enterprise in
the U.S.:
1. Exclusion of Specific Groups
Because private sector organizations have the latitude to be
selective in their choice of form, mission and beneficiaries, some
groups of individuals may be overlooked by a social business
model driven by revenue generation. Unlike both the government,
which is constrained by constitutional and statutory requirements
mandating a more even-handed approach, and the European model,
which is historically premised upon community development and
the ideal of inclusion of outlier groups, the U.S. model may result
in the unintended consequence of exclusion or—at least—
inadvertent omission.136
2. Risks to Civil Society
Nonprofit scholarship is replete with paeans about the
contribution the nonprofit sector makes to civil society by
developing ―social capital.‖ 137 Scholars argue that social capital
134

See the discussion of ―type 1‖ self-sustaining nonprofits at notes 81–88
and accompanying text.
135
See supra notes 101106 and accompanying text.
136
Kerlin, supra note 128, at 258.
137
Id. at 258 n.6: ―Social Capital includes the social norms of trust,
cooperation, and reciprocity that develop through positive citizen interaction and
which undergirds the effective functioning of democracy and a market
economy.‖ (citing E. Backman & S.R. Smith, Health Organizations, Unhealthy
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development (and, with it, the vibrancy of civil society) may be
diminished by the social enterprise movement in the following
respects:
a. ―[A] growing focus on the bottom line may lead
organizations to abandon less efficient practices that
strengthen social capital, such as running a volunteer
program.‖138
b. As organizations, like social businesses, become selfsustaining they may discover they do not need to rely on
―traditional stakeholders and networks such as private
donors, members, community volunteers and other
community organizations with the result that opportunities
to promote social capital are lost.‖ 139
c. Finally, the mission shift to revenue generation may lead
to a shift in board membership from community leaders
and volunteers to financial experts and business advisors. 140
3.

Lack of Oversight Assistance and Public Policy Direction
From the U.S. Government

―In the United States virtually no new policy has been created
over the past 50 years to accommodate the business activities of
the growing number of nonprofits involved in social enterprise.‖141
In that regard, the U.S. lags significantly behind E.U. countries.
Beginning with Italy in 1991, legislation has made provision for,
and given guidance to, social business forms in Belgium (1995),
Communities?, 10 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 355 (2000)). De
Tocqueville was perhaps the first to recognize the salutary effect of grass-roots
nonprofits on developing the skills to sustain a strong civil society. See Barbara
K. Bucholtz, Reflections on the Role of Nonprofit Associations in a
Representative Democracy, 7 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL‘Y 555, 557 (1998).
138
Kerlin, supra, note 128, at 258.
139
Id. But see Fishman, supra note 1, at 605 (―Public benefit corporations
arose originally in England as for-profit companies that provided a social
benefit.‖). The U.K.‘s new Office of the Third Sector uses that definition for
social businesses. Id. at 601.
140
Kerlin, supra note 128, at 258.
141
Id. at 253.
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Portugal (1998), Greece (1999), France (2001) and most recently
the U.K. (2005).142 In describing the British model, Professor
Fishman notes the hybrid nature of the social business: it has both
a charitable mission and a revenue-generation mission. Thus, it
represents a new form of social organization and should, perhaps,
be considered a ―‗fourth sector‘ of society.‖143
Social business has a proven track record of revenue generation
for charitable causes but it obviously carries with it significant
risks. The risks to the sector and to society invite legislative reform
to define and give direction to this new sector. The social
enterprise phenomenon, however, is only one example of the need
to ―rethink‖ the regulation of nonprofit associations as Fishman 144
and other experts have suggested.145
142

Id. at 254. For an expanded discussion of the ―CIC‖ (Community
Interest Company) under the new British statute, see Fishman, supra note 1, at
60003. He notes that differences between the U.S. model and the U.K.‘s CIC
are an asset lock and a partial distribution constraint. Id. at 606.
143
Fishman, supra note 1, at 598.
144
Id. at 60607. Fishman has suggested that much of the regulatory
regime that polices the lapses in fiduciary obligations by nonprofits should be
returned to the state and local level. Id. But he also observes that the emergence
of the social enterprise model itself (in all its varieties and permutations)
challenges us to broaden our reformist perspective. Id. at 60307.
145
Examples of scholarship counseling regulatory reform include Ellen P.
Aprill, What Critiques of Sarbanes-Oxley Can Teach About Regulation of
Nonprofit Governance, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 765 (2007); David A. Brennen,
The Commerciality Doctrine as Applied to the Charitable Tax Exemption for
Homes for the Aged: State and Local Perspectives, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 833
(2007); Evelyn Brody, The Board of Nonprofit Organizations: Puzzling Through
the Gaps Between Law and Practice, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 521 (2007); Marion
R. Fremont-Smith, The Search for Greater Accountability of Nonprofit
Organizations: Recent Legal Developments and Proposals for Change, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. 609 (2007); Gibelman & Gelman, supra note 3; Garry W.
Jenkins, Incorporation Choice, Uniformity, and the Reform of Nonprofit State
Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1113 (2007); Lloyd H. Mayer, The Much Maligned 527
and Institutional Choice, 87 B.U. L. REV. 625 (2007); Dana Brakman Reiser,
Director Independence in the Independent Sector, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 795
(2007); Dana Brakman Reiser, There Ought to Be a Law: The Disclosure Focus
of Recent Legislative Proposals for Nonprofit Reform, 80 CHI. KENT L. REV.
559 (2005); Linda Sugin, Resisting the Corporatization of Nonprofit
Governance: Transforming Obedience into Fidelity, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 893
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IV. REFORMING THE NONPROFIT SECTOR TO RESTRAIN ITS
COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY: AN ASSESSMENT
There can be no doubt that a legislative reappraisal of the
nonprofit sector is overdue.146 The emergence of the social
enterprise model, alone, signals the need for a reappraisal. But
social businesses are only one example of the types of commercial
vehicles charities are employing to sustain themselves and their
missions today. Furthermore, taken as a whole these forays into
business ventures now represent a large portion of nonprofit
finances today:
Data from the National Center for Charitable Statistics at
The Urban Institute suggest that social enterprise [in the
broad sense of revenue-generating ventures of all kinds]
continues to rise in the United States. The commercial
activities of nonprofits were tracked over 20 years (19822002) using a database of financial information that
nonprofits with $25,000 and over in revenue file with the
U.S. Internal Revenue Service. Commercial revenue
included program service revenue (fee-for-service), net
income from sales of goods, net income from special events
and activities and membership dues and assessments for
which members received comparable benefits. Analysis
found that over the 20 year period, commercial revenue
was not only consistently the largest income producer but
(2007). But see Michael S. Knoll, The UBIT: Leveling an Uneven Playing Field
or Titling a Level One, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 857 (2007) (demonstrating that
UBIT could be an example of regulation that goes too far and puts nonprofits at
an unfair disadvantage).
146
Congress has tacitly acknowledged as much in hearings held recently,
although a reform consensus has yet to emerge. See Overview of the Tax-Exempt
Sector: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th Cong. (2005),
available
at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode
=detail&hearing=400; Charities and Charitable Giving: Proposals for Reform:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 109th Cong. (2005), available at
http://finance.senate.gov/sitepages/hearing030505.htm; Elizabeth Kingsley &
John Pomeranz, A Crash at the Crossroads: Tax and Campaign Finance Collide
in Regulation of Political Activities of Tax-Exempt Organizations, 10 EO
JOURNAL 186 (2005).
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also that it grew substantially. From 1982 to 2002, the
commercial revenue of nonprofits increased by 219%,
private contributions by 197% and government grants by
169%. Most significantly, it also grew as a share of total
revenue. In 1982 commercial income made up 48.1% of
nonprofit revenue but by 2002 it accounted for 57.6%.
Meanwhile, private contributions only grew from 19.9% to
22.2% and government grants from 17.0% to 17.2%.147
These studies mentioned above conclusively demonstrate that
for-profit activity in the nonprofit sector is expanding at an
accelerated rate and that the decline in government services and
financial support has at the very least exacerbated this trend, if it
has not been a principal driver of it.
Reform-minded scholars are unquestionably right to advocate a
retrospective analysis of the sector with a view to its overhaul.
Leading scholars should also persuade us that the narrow attention
that the media and Congress are paying to perennial scandals as the
focus of reform legislation is hopelessly short-sighted and
inadequate.148 The broader agendas advocated by scholars will
surely result in better outcomes. 149
147

Kerlin, supra note 128, at 252 (citations omitted).
See Fishman, supra note 1, at 572, 587. ―Additional regulation merely
increases the burdens of nonprofit status, or in economic jargon, transaction
costs, at the expense of focusing on mission.‖ Id. at 568. Fishman also suggests
that there is a need to get beyond these ―erroneous assumptions‖ and
―incremental approaches.‖ Id. at 567.
149
See, e.g., id. at 567, 570, 57479, 584 (arguing for a reassessment of the
―proper scope of the 501(c)(3) universe,‖ a ―redefinition of the charitable
sector,‖ and a shift from federal regulation of the fiduciary obligations of
nonprofit boards and managers to state and local authorities). See also Brennan,
supra note 145 (discussing the abandonment of the historical understanding of
what it meant to be a ―charitable‖ institution as it pertains, especially, to
eldercare facilities and using eldercare as an exemplar of how to parse the
commerciality doctrine in order to make a useful distinction between exempt
and nonexempt organizations for purposes of assessing local property taxes);
Colombo, Reforming I.R.C. Provisions, supra note 1 (advocating a reassessment
of the proper role of the federal tax code as it relates to charities); FremontSmith, supra note 145 (surveying the current legislative landscape of reformist
proposals); Jenkins, supra note 145 (presenting an empirical study of how state
governance law for nonprofits is shaped primarily by private law making
148
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In this Article, I have argued that, as a preliminary matter, the
reformist perspective should be enlarged to include an appreciation
of the impact that a pro-business ideology has had on public policy
choices in contemporary America, and an understanding of the
effects that this ideological policy driver has had for the nonprofit
sector, the government sector, and ultimately the representative
democracy of which they are a part. An adequate analysis of those
phenomena invites both quantitative and qualitative research
projects.
A preliminary assessment of the evidence currently available
can be summarized as follows: At a minimum, circumstantial
evidence suggests that anti-government fervor in recent decades
has led to the downsizing of government and either an outsourcing
of many of its programs or a privatization of them.150 Especially in
the social services sector, nonprofits have tried to meet the societal
need created by the downsizing phenomenon with efforts to
expand their own services. This, in turn, has led nonprofits to seek
new sources of income to support their expansion. These new
sources have included government contracting through
privatization and, especially, commercial activity. 151 What have we
observed from that experience? We can acknowledge that the
success of commercial activity, in its various forms, has provided
the capital necessary to fill (at least partially) the infrastructure gap
left by government downsizing. That recognition is important
because a reform program seeking to curtail perceived excesses of
entrepreneurial activity by nonprofits that fails to appreciate this
groups—ALI; ABA; NCCUSL—with minimal input from nonprofit
associations themselves and the consequences of that for the reform movement
in nonprofit law); Knoll, supra note 145 (demonstrating that UBIT unfairly
burdens the nonprofit sector‘s commercial activities); Reiser, There Ought to Be
a Law, supra note 145 (demonstrating that legislative reform of nonprofit
regulation at both the federal and state levels will be ineffectual because of the
political reality that government enforcement systems at all levels of
government are critically under-funded); Reiser, Director Independence, supra
note 145 (arguing that the ―best practices‖ model for for-profit corporate boards
comprised of a majority of independent directors may be an inappropriate model
for nonprofit boards because their situation is inapposite).
150
See Gibelman & Gelman, supra note 3 and accompanying text.
151
Id.
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point will surely confront the effects of unintended consequences.
We can also observe, as an empirical fact, that the effort to engage
in commercial enterprise to support nonprofit missions has inspired
important innovative forms of associational hybrids, like the social
business form.152 As reformers rethink the nonprofit sector, the
characteristics and experiences of these new associational forms
should be an invaluable resource.
At the same time, there are significant downsides to the
business activity of nonprofits. In this Article, I have observed that,
in addition to the statutory hazards posed by commercialization in
the sector, business ventures in all forms create other risks: mission
drift; reputational hazards; and (as discussed below) the diminution
of the sector‘s capacity to generate social capital requisite to the
maintenance of a representative democracy. Taking a larger view,
research suggests that, as a contiguous matter, the phenomenon we
now observe in the nonprofit sector impacts the public sector in a
152

Among the surfeit of creative solutions developed by the nonprofit
sector, the media has given attention to the following, which I include for
purposes of illustration:
1. Teach for America: a nonprofit organization that prepares graduates
from elite colleges to teach underprivileged children. Among other
things, it works in conjunction with the Knowledge is Power Program
(KIPP), a network of charter schools dedicated to improving the
educational opportunities for these children. Sam Dillon, 2 School
Entrepreneurs Lead the Way on Change, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2008, at
A15.
2. Farm Rescue: a volunteer organization that helps farmers hit by
disasters to get back on their feet by supplying the agricultural labor
required. Blake Nicholson, Businessman Creates Hope for Struggling
U.S. Farmers, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 2, 2008, available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0702/p12s01-usgn.html.
3. ShopRite Supermarket: a for-profit grocery store providing low cost
nutritional food to inner city neighborhoods ―aimed at squashing
obesity and related concerns such as heart disease and diabetes.‖ The
project was initially funded by a loan from Pennsylvania‘s Fresh Food
Financing Initiative and may be the first successful public-private
program of its kind. Sarah More McCann, Wanted: Inner City
Supermarkets, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 26, 2008, available at
http://features.csmonitor.com/innovation/2008/06/27/wanted-innercity-supermarkets.
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negative way as well. As government has diminished its capacity
to serve the community by outsourcing (contracting its programs to
nonprofits and for-profits) or privatizing (abandoning) them, and
as nonprofits have stepped in to fill the gap with resources
generated by commercial activity, both the public sector and the
nonprofit sector have suffered.
Studies indicate several trends. First, the social capital that
forms the matrix which binds the elements or factions of civil
society and of representative democracies together is weakened.153
Privatization of government programs and services has burgeoned
in the past quarter-century.154 Empirical studies of the phenomenon
indicate that the dominance of these contractual arrangements
weakens democratic decision-making, 155 as well as the doctrine of
state action and constitutional accountability in government.156
Thus, representative democracy itself is weakened and with it the
public‘s belief in government accountability and transparency. 157
Evidence shows privatization also weakens the nonprofit sector.
153

The idea of ―social capital‖ is nascent in the work of de Tocqueville and
his observations that grass roots voluntary associations in the U.S. develop the
organizational skills requisite to citizenship in a representative democracy, see
Bucholtz, supra note 137 and accompanying text, and the work of James
Madison and his observations about the importance of memberships in
overlapping factions. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison). But the
concept was famously developed by ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE
COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (Simon & Schuster 2000).
There are two constituent categories of social capital: ―bridging social capital‖
(building ―norms of trust and reciprocity‖ among factions in society) and
―bonding social capital‖ (developing ―norms of felt solidarity‖). Sheila Suess
Kennedy & Wolfgang Bielefeld, Hollowing Out Civil Society? Government
Contracting and Social Capital, DEMOCRACY & SOCIETY 6 (2004). Grass roots
voluntary organizations are believed to foster both kinds of social capital.
154
See Kennedy & Bielefeld, supra note 153, at 7 (―Government contracts
in the United States now account for nearly 40% of all voluntary sector income,
and by some estimates 80% of the income of social-service-providing
nonprofits.‖).
155
See Shelia S. Kennedy, When is Private Public? State Action in the Era
of Privatization and Public-Private Partnerships, 11 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS.
L.J. 203, 204–08 (2001).
156
Id. at 207.
157
See id.
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Nonprofit contracting parties become beholden to the terms of the
contract and their contracting partners in the public sector, rather
than to their boards and donors. 158 Contracting with the
government erodes the voluntariness of nonprofit organizations
and, thereby, the social capital networks they are said to provide,
just as it erodes the accountability and transparency of the
government. Moreover, the dominance of the government as a
contracting partner may create a financial dependency upon the
government to sustain nonprofit projects, further compromising
their status as members of a voluntary and independent sector,
perhaps even ―stifling grass-roots advocacy efforts by private
voluntary organizations.‖159 One has to ask whether America‘s
infatuation with the business sector is worth that price.
Second, commercialization also has a negative effect on the
voluntary characteristic of the nonprofit sector. Like contracts with
government agencies, studies have shown that commercial projects
decrease active participation by volunteers.160 Voluntary
contributions of work and finance are the sine qua non of nonprofit
organizations and the foundational characteristic that develops
social capital. Studies show that this vital element is weakened by
both the privatization and the commercialization precipitated by
government downsizing.
Third, while the public and nonprofit sectors have suffered
some injury from the phenomenon, the evidence suggests that the
for-profit sector has enjoyed a distinct advantage from downsizing
the public sector. As examples, the well-publicized contracts of
158

―When nonprofit organizations contract with the State, they become
accountable in ways that are qualitatively different from the accountability owed
to board members and even donors.‖ Kennedy & Bielefeld, supra note 153, at 7.
159
Id. (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRIVATIZATION: LESSONS
LEARNED BY STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (1997)); MATTHEW CRENSON &
BENJAMIN GINSBURG, DOWNSIZING DEMOCRACY: HOW AMERICA SIDELINED ITS
CITIZENS AND PRIVATIZED THE PUBLIC (Johns Hopkins University Press 2002).
160
See Bernard Enjolras, Commercialization of Voluntary Organizations
and Members’ Participation: The Case of Norwegian Voluntary Sport
Organizations, 2 DEMOCRACY & SOCIETY 8 (2004). This study chronicled the
decline in volunteerism in proportion to the increase in commercial activity by
the sports organizations and found that ―[t]here exists apparently a crowding out
effect of voluntary work by commercial incomes.‖ Id. at 10.
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Halliburton and Blackwater in the Bush administration‘s Iraq War
have been enlightening.161
Fourth, and finally, since much of the debate about downsizing
and privatization centers on the extent to which government should
provide a social safety net for its citizens, some attention should be
paid to that complex issue as well.
A useful place to access the available evidence is found in
Jeffery Sachs‘ recent book Common Wealth.162 There he
summarizes recent statistics that challenge the efficacy of a probusiness ideology. He divides capitalist societies into three groups:
1) ―social welfare societies‖ (Denmark, Finland, Norway and
Sweden); 2) ―mixed economies‖ (Austria, Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands); and 3) ―(relatively) freemarket countries‖ (Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the
United Kingdom and the United States). These three groups
represent the spectrum of government spending to provide citizens
with a social safety net as a percent of national income (GNP).
And he uses empirical evidence to answer two questions raised by
the claims of a pro-business, anti-government ideology:
1. Do strong social safety net programs threaten the
economic strength of a capitalist
society by ―under
min[ing] market mechanisms and . . . distort[ing]
the
incentives vital to healthy economic growth and
performance?‖163
2. Are attempts to provide a safety net for the
disadvantaged futile?
161

The publicity surrounding those contracts has been ubiquitous and needs
no elaboration here, although Paul R. Verkuil gives the problem an interesting
overview. PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY: WHY
PRIVATIZATION OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND
WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT (Cambridge University Press 2007). Verkuil
attempts to reintroduce pragmatism and balance to the debate over privatization
and to analyze whether particular societal tasks should be assigned to a
particular sector, using the outsourcing of military and related functions as his
focus. Id.
162
See generally JEFFERY D. SACHS, COMMON WEALTH: ECONOMICS FOR A
CROWDED PLANET (The Penguin Press 2008).
163
Id. at 257.
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The research Sachs provides suggests that not only are the
claims upon which these two questions are premised false but there
is abundant evidence showing that the opposites appear to be true.
Sachs argues that ―[t]he evidence suggests that the high social
spending in the social-welfare states is indeed very effective in
reducing poverty and inequality and in promoting health and
prosperity . . . .‖164 He continues that, ―[i]n terms of wealth and per
capita income, the social-welfare states again defy the [ideological]
stereotype that high taxation leads to lower living standards.‖165
Further, the social welfare states have achieved high levels of
income, low rates of poverty and a more equal distribution of
income than the free-market societies.166 By contrast, ―[t]he United
States, among the richest of all the countries in per capita, GNP,
also has the highest poverty rate by far, at 17.1 percent of
households living on 50 percent or less than average household
income.‖167 Social welfare states also appear to have lower rates of
corruption and high public confidence in the government: ―They
are rated very highly in their international competitiveness . . . [and
t]hey achieve high rates of national saving, despite the high tax
burden. They achieve balanced budgets, despite the large social
outlays, because the high public spending is matched by adequate
taxation.‖168 ―Another striking fact about the social-welfare states
is their very high rate of technological excellence . . . [t]hey are
heavy investors both in R&D and in higher education and they
have very high rates of patents per capita as well.‖ 169
All of this evidence is presented not to suggest that the
Scandinavian approach can be a panacea for U.S. problems. After
all, the homogeneity of those societies must account for some of
their abundant successes. 170 But neither does ethnic homogeneity
vitiate the evidence that strong, well-funded government
infrastructure programs can improve the operations of the economy
164
165
166
167
168
169
170

Id. at 261.
Id. at 262.
Id.
Id. at 261.
Id. at 262.
Id. at 263.
Id. at 265.
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as well as the living conditions of the citizens. It is the kind of
evidence that challenges the current U.S. ideology and helps us to
rethink its assumptions.
A retrospective analysis that incorporates what we have learned
about the way societies employ, or assign roles to, the three
governance sectors and the consequences of those choices must
surely precede and inform attempts to reform the nonprofit sector.
CONCLUSION
Commercial activity by nonprofit associations has allowed the
nonprofits to sustain and expand their operations in an era of
government downsizing. But this activity comes with significant
risks to individual nonprofit organizations, to the nonprofit sector
and, I argue, to society. Calls for reform of the sector are
undoubtedly justified, but reformers need to rethink the ideological
policy choices that encouraged the entrepreneurial turn in the
nonprofit sector and the effects of those policies on the fabric of
society. Reform must begin with a pragmatic reassessment of the
effective roles each sector might play in achieving societal goals.

